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I. INTRODUCTION
Humans are weak at probabilistic reasoning. When
confronted with particular statistics relating to uncertain events,
people often greatly misestimate the events' likelihoods.
Doctors and patients are humans. As a group, they also are
subject to this foible. Because medical care options typically
involve probabilistic reasoning, the failure to reasonably grasp
their potential consequences may lead to unwise advice and
choices. Grossly overestimated risks may traumatize patients.
Consent to procedures based on substantial misapprehensions of
their costs and benefits is hardly informed.
There are several areas of the law in which the consequence
of misestimating probabilities may come into play, including
negligence and contributory negligence, products liability, DNA
and fingerprint identification, and paternity testing. In what
follows I show the reach of the problem in the medical care
context. Then I turn to the nature of probabilistic reasoning. It
is not as transparent as one might expect. The established
approaches to probabilistic reasoning include the Bayesians and
the frequentists. Their theories are briefly explicated. We will
find that the Bayesian approach is not as intuitive as the
frequentist approach. I then speculate as to why the frequentist
approach is easier to grasp. It may be the evolutionary result of
the way in which ancestral humans gained and processed
probabilistic information on the prehistoric savanna. Be that as
it may, I then ponder the availability of legal remedies for the
harm that may ensue from a medical prognosis that is grossly
misleading because it is put in Bayesian, rather than frequentist,
terms. Two tort theories are examined: informed consent and
. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Neil Cohen, Tony Sebok, and
Larry Solan for valuable comments on prior drafts. This research was gratefully supported
by a summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School.
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:527
the negligent infliction of emotional harm. Neither theory, I
conclude, offers general relief without some development.
Perhaps the medical profession should handle this problem itself
by better training and methods of explaining medical choices.
II. THE PROBLEM
Shortly after your routine annual physical, your doctor asks
you to return promptly to his office to discuss the results of the
blood tests. Since this return visit had not been needed before,
you are a bit anxious when you sit down in his office.
Following formal niceties, he gets down to business. "I have
some bad news for you. One of the test results was positive.
While, as usual, there are no perceptible symptoms at this stage,
it appears that you may have an aggressive disease that is
usually fatal."
You take a deep breath and ask for more information. Your
doctor reports that the prevalence of this disease is 1/1000, but
that the test has a false positive rate of 5%. There are no avail-
able follow-up tests. The only way to tell for sure whether you
have the disease is to do an exploratory operation. If it turns out
that you have the ailment, the operation can offer some relief but
no real hope of full recovery.
Composing yourself as well as you can, you ask what the
numbers associated with the test mean. "What are the chances
that I actually have this disease?" "Well," your doctor responds,
as would perhaps nearly half of all physicians, "I'm not a
statistician, but it seems that the chances you have it are about
95%."1
1. These numbers come from a study done at Harvard Medical School among twenty
house officers, twenty attending physicians, and twenty fourth-year medical students. See
Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results, 299
NEw ENG. J. MED. 999, 999 (1978). On the chance of having the disease, 45% of the
respondents answered 95%. Id. at 1000. Only 18% correctly answered less than 2%. Id. at
999-1000. "The average of all answers was 55.9 per cent, a 30-fold overestimation of
disease likelihood." Id. at 1000. The actual study used this less dramatic hypothetical: "If
a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, what is
the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, assuming
that you know nothing about the person's symptoms or signs?" Id. at 999. "If the
physician greatly overestimated the likelihood that such results had clinical consequence,




You put off the decision on whether to have the exploratory
operation. You need some time to think about it. At home, a
relative urges you to get a second opinion, so you take your test
results to another doctor. Once in her office, she looks at the test
results and, though admitting she knows nothing about your
health status, explains what they mean:
1 out of every 1000 Americans has [this] disease. [This]
test [you took] has been developed to detect when a person
has [the disease]. Every time the test is given to a person
who has the disease, the test comes out positive (i.e., the
"true positive" rate is 100%). But sometimes the test also
comes out positive when it is given to a person who is
completely healthy. Specifically, out of every 1000 people
who are perfectly healthy, 50 of them test positive for the
disease (i.e., the "false positive" rate is 5%).
"Ah!" you blurt out. "If there are fifty false positives for
every true positive, then the chance of me actually having the
disease is only about 2%." She replies, "That's the way I figure
it too.''3  As it turns out, this is more accurate "bayesian
reasoning.",
4
Obviously, you are greatly relieved at the revised
prognosis. Indeed, I can relieve you even more by reporting that
you actually do not have this disease after all. But in the
meantime, you were severely traumatized by the original
prognosis. Though not a pessimistic person, you heard the death
knell with this report of having a 95% probability of suffering
from a fatal disease. Even though you did not act on the mental
suffering you endured, some may choose to "not go gentle into
2. The test of this form of the medical diagnosis problem was conducted at Stanford
University. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians
After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 58 COGNITION 1, 24 (1996).
3. In this frequentist version of the diagnosis problem by Cosmides and Tooby, 56%
of the respondents answered that the chances of having the disease are 2%, 28% said the
chances are 1/1000 (0.1%), and 4% said the chances are 95%. See id. at 27. In replicating
the original, non-frequentist version of the problem by Casscells at Harvard Medical
School, 56% of the Stanford students answered that the chances of having the disease are
95%, 12% said 2%, and 12% said 1/1000 (0.1%). See id
4. See id. at 27. Cosmides and Tooby "use the term bayesian reasoning-with a
small 'b'-to refer to any cognitive procedure that causes subjects to reliably produce
answers that satisfy Bayes' rule, whether that procedure operates on representations of
frequencies or single-event probabilities." Id. at 9.
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that good night," 5 by, for example, quitting their jobs (once
making sure their medical insurance would not be cancelled),
running up bills, dropping lifetime projects, taking high risks,
"setting things straight" with certain people, et cetera. Had you
been diagnosed with a high probability of a socially abhorred
ailment, you may have been shunned by others and suffered
irreversible consequences.6 Whatever the final consequence, the
original prognosis caused you significant harm of various types.
Why was the prognosis so far off? What is to be done about it?
After examining the nature of probabilistic reasoning, I consider
these two questions in turn.
A. Difficulties in Probabilistic Reasoning
"Probabilities quantify uncertainty."' 7  The meaning and
application of probabilistic reasoning has long been subject to
5. DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in THE COLLECTED
POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 128 (1957) ("Do not go gentle into that good night, / Old age
should burn and rave at close of day; / Rage, rage against the dying of the light."). Steven
Pinker ascribes to natural selection "our deepest strivings," including "why we do not go
gentle into that good night but rage, rage against the dying of the light." STEVEN PINKER,
THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 52 (2002).
6. For example, one woman who received a false positive when screened for H1V in
the mid-90's was shunned by her colleagues, lost her job, had unprotected sex thinking it
would make no difference, did not touch her young son for fear of infecting him, and, in
general, underwent severe emotional suffering. See GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED
RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS DECEIVE You 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter
GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS]. The attorney for a. patient who was informed of a
false positive for HIV stated: "With a positive result you may not be able to get insurance,
establish a mortgage or buy a car." Caitlin A. Schnid, Note, Protecting the Physician in
HIV Misdiagnosis Cases, 46 DUKE L.J. 431, 431 (1997) (quoting Jennifer Ditchburn, Man
Sues Doctor Who Allegedly Misdiagnosed AIDS Virus: Negative Result Was Revealed
Month After First Diagnosis, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 23, 1995, at A5). In Hartwig v.
Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, a suit by a woman stuck by a contaminated hypodermic needle
possibly infected with HIV, the woman's husband was ready to testify that "during the 6-
month period after her accident, [she] would disappear into a room and cry for hours on
end, was impatient with their children, and showed no affection for him or their
children.... [She was also] shunned by their friends because of the friends' irrational fear
of HIV infection." 580 N.W.2d 86, 88, 89 (Neb. 1998). In the similar case of Williamson
v. Waldman, the victim allegedly became depressed and "suffered 'lifestyle changes,,"
refused to have another child in fear of it being infected, and suffered a loss of earning
capacity. 696 A.2d 14, 16-17 (N.J. 1997).
7. Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 359, 359 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982). "A probability, according to Bayesians.... is simply a number between zero and
one that represents the extent to which a somewhat idealized person believes a statement to
be true." Id.
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debate. 8  The fundamental divide is between Bayesians, who
contend that probability refers to subjective degrees of
confidence that an event has occurred, and frequentists, who see
it as referring to the objective frequencies of events among
repeated activities, and not the likelihood of a particular, unique
event.9 In any case, Bayes' rule is often used to calculate unique
events,' 0 as in the introductory hypothetical about the fatal
disease. The Bayesian and frequentist approaches to probability
are similar and are often used interchangeably.ll
8. See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL
WORLD 244 n.1 (2000) [hereinafter GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING]; GERD
GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE OF CHANCE: How PROBABILITY CHANGED SCIENCE
AND EVERYDAY LIFE § 8.2, at 274-76 (1982) [hereinafter GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE OF
CHANCE]; Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 322-29 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). For an example of
the debate in a legal context, compare D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coeffi-
cients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1987), with Neil B. Cohen,
Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen, Conceptualizing].
9. There are also other meanings of probability. See GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE OF
CHANCE, supra note 8, § 8.2, at 276; Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability
Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 899, 906-20. For introductions to the development and controversies surrounding
probabilistic reasoning, see ELLIOTT SOBER, PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY § 3.2 (2d ed. 2000);
Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen, Confidence];
Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 2, at 2-9; see also Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage,
How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102
PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 694-95 (1995) (outlining "three major non-Bayesian cognitive
algorithms"). "[T]he frequentist interpretation of probability has been dominant since
about 1840." GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 246. For an extensive
historical introduction, see GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE OF CHANCE, supra note 8, §§ 1.1-
3.8, at 1-122.
10. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 9, at 391 ("Theory eventually caught up with
intuition, and by the 1950's probability estimates of unique events had been incorporated
into probability theory."). "By the mid-1970's, however, an articulate backlash had
developed." Id. Others "have rebutted these arguments and have bolstered those
supporting the use of subjective probabilities in legal analysis." Id at 392.
11. See Cohen, Conceptualizing, supra note 8, at 87-88.
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But Bayes' rule is not easy to apply. 12  Bayes' rule is:
p(H]D) = p(H)p(DIH) / p(H)p(DIH) + p(-H)p(DI-H), where D
refers to the data and H to the hypothesis being tested. In the
hypothetical case, D refers to the positive test results, H to
whether the patient has the disease, and -H to the conclusion that
the patient does not have the disease. Plugging the numbers in
the hypothetical into Bayes' rule yields the following result:
p(H]D) = (.001)(1) / [(.001)(1) + (.999)(.05)] = .0196, or 1.96%.
This is the same result as was found by use of frequency
analysis,' 3 but the calculation is considerably more difficult.
The use of Bayes' rule is not intuitive, 14 and the reasoning of
most people fails to follow it.' 5  Nevertheless, medical texts
usually rely on it. 16
12. Nevertheless, "[i]n the last few decades, the standard probability format has
become a common way to communicate information ranging from the medical and
statistical textbooks to psychological experiments." Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 9,
at 686. Yet in the courtroom, other than in paternity cases, which "are exceptional in terms
of the ease with which the available evidence lends itself to Bayesian aggregation ....
Bayes's theorem is rarely used ... where the complexities of translating evidence into a
digestible Bayesian form can be daunting." Jonathan J. Koehler, Probabilities in the
Courtroom: An Evaluation of the Objections and Policies, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 167, 177 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (omitting citations to
paternity cases "of Bayesian confusion and error"). For a brief discussion of how juries
and judges sometimes misunderstand "the prevailing Bayesian approach" with respect to
DNA matches in a criminal case, see David Wasserman, Forensic DNA Typing, in A
COMPANION TO GENETHICS 349, 353-54 (Justine Burley & John Harris eds., 2002). "The
integration of DNA evidence into legal proof presents several challenges that go beyond
the usual doubts about lay comprehension of scientific And quantitative evidence." Id. at
353.
13. More exactly, the frequency analysis would be: one out of a thousand has the
disease. With a false positive rate of 5%, of the remaining 999, 49.95 of them (999 x .05)
will test positive. Therefore, the chances of having the disease following a positive test is 1
/(1 + 49.95) = 0.0196, or 1.96%.
14. Lev R. Ginzburg et al., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Evolution May Not Favor a
Probabilistic Calculus, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 24, 24 (1996) ("Probability theory is
almost paradoxically nonintuitive.").
15. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 61 (mentioning "an
avalanche of studies reporting that laypeople's reasoning does not follow Bayes' rule");
Lainie Friedman Ross, Genetic Testing of Children: Who Should Consent?, in A
COMPANION TO GENETHICS, supra note 12, at 114, 114 (citing studies that "reveal that
both physicians and patients have a difficult time grasping probabilities"); Reid Hastie &
W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can 't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As a Risk Manager,
40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 909-10 (1998) ("A flood of empirical results and interpretations has
demonstrated that people are not well-endowed to reason coherently about the probabilities
of occurrence of individual events.... [B]y and large, information about probabilities is
often misunderstood and misused."). Even Stephen Jay Gould, no fan of evolutionary
psychology, see, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Sociobiology and Human Nature: A
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The initial hypothetical is relatively simple. Unlike most
real world situations, the test produces no false negatives. When
false negatives are added to a problem, doctors may do even
worse. For example, in one study physicians were tested on this
problem:
The probability that a patient has breast cancer is 1%....
If the patient has breast cancer, the probability that the
radiologist will correctly diagnose it is 80% [i.e., there are
20% false negatives]. If the patient has a benign lesion (no
breast cancer), the probability that the radiologist will
incorrectly diagnose it as cancer is 9.6% (false positive
rate). . . . What is the probability that a patient with a
positive mammogram actually has breast cancer?
17
Of the 100 physicians in the study, 95 estimated the
probability of the woman having breast cancer to be about
75%. 18 If they had plugged the data into Bayes' rule, they
Postpanglossian Vision, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED 283, 283 (Ashley Montagu ed.,
1980), agrees that "our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to work by the rules of
probability .. " Stephen Jay Gould, The Streak of Streaks, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 18,
1988, at 8, reprinted in STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS
IN NATURAL HISTORY 463, 469 (1991). For the proposition that the persuasiveness of
statistical information depends on its formulations in terms of probabilities or frequencies,
see Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make
DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1277-78
(2001).
16. See GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS, supra note 6, at 5.
17. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 60 (citing David M.
Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 7, at 249, 252-54); Gerd Gigerenzer, Is the
Mind Irrational or Ecologically Rational?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 37, 52-55 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) [hereinafter
Gigerenzer, Irrational]; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 9, at 685-86; Gerd Gigerenzer,
The Psychology of Good Judgment: Frequency Formats and Simple Algorithms, 16 MED.
DECISION MAKING 273, 275-77 (1996) [hereinafter Gigerenzer, Good Judgment].
18. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 60. In replicating this
study with physicians, Gigerenzer found 8% of the physicians got the Bayesian answer. Id.
at 66. The median estimate of having breast cancer was 70%. Id. Gigerenzer reports that
the director of one university clinic, who estimated the probability of having breast cancer
as 90%, nervously commented, "I never inform my patients about statistical data. I would
tell the patient that mammography is not so exact, and I would, in any case, perform a
biopsy." Id. at 65. Does this satisfy the strictures of informed consent? Based on my
search of the primary legal literature, I would guess that this doctor's tactic is not
uncommon. For example, in a Boolean search of Westlaw cases with the terms and
connectors "'informed consent' or 'malpractice' w/200 'false positive' or 'false negative',"
not one relevant case turned up. Other comparable Boolean searches of Westlaw and Lexis
also turned up negative.
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would have found this result: p(I]D) = (.01)(.80) / [(.01)(.80) +
(.99)(.096)] = .078. The actual probability is 7.8%, not nearly
ten times larger as most of the doctors estimated. The estimates
of the vast majority of these doctors were off by nearly an order
of magnitude.19 We can well imagine the differences in the
reactions of most women and their loved ones to hearing that
their likelihood of having breast cancer is 75% rather than 7.8%.
Certainly their choices of treatment options would be
accordingly skewed.z
If the physicians had used frequentist terms in analyzing the
problem, they may have reasoned this way: Out of every
thousand women patients, ten of them have breast cancer (1%).
For every thousand women patients, eight of them will be
correctly diagnosed by the radiologists as having the cancer
(80% of the ten with cancer). Of the remaining 990 patients
without the cancer (1000 - 10), ninety-five of them will be
19. "A survey of the medical literature on mammography reveals that physicians
regularly confuse the predictive accuracy of the test (the probability the patient has cancer
given a positive mammography) with its retrospective accuracy (the probability of a
positive mammography given that the patient has cancer)." GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE
OF CHANCE, supra note 8, at 258 (citation omitted). "Equating the two can result in errors
of an order of magnitude or more." Id. But this is not the only problem. Once the
confusion is avoided, physicians "must still deal with the impact of this evidence on the
patient's prior probability of having breast cancer." Id. For example, if the patient sought
the examination because she had discovered a lump:
[h]er prior probability of having cancer is significantly different from that for
an asymptomatic patient examined in a screening clinic .... Yet practicing
physicians, following the medical texts and journals that instruct them,
usually ignore or drastically underweight these prior probabilities in
evaluating the import of a positive mammogram, greatly increasing the
number of biopsies performed.
Id. In concluding this chapter ("Numbers Rule the World"), the authors note that
"[p]robability and statistics have indeed become the very guide of life." Id. at 270. But for
reasons that go beyond merely the difficulty in understanding the use of the concepts:
there is no application so innocuous as to be neutral, in the sense of simply
mirroring the bare facts of the matter .... It is part of our Pythagorean creed
to believe that quantification is merely description, but the reverberations of
the applications of statistics show how far this claim strays from the mark.
GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE OF CHANCE, supra note 8, at 270.
20. In the face of the uncertainties that currently beset breast cancer treatment, one
doctor reportedly urges radical surgery for his patients, though whether this is the best
course is unknown, because the patients "neither comprehend nor tolerate knowledge of the
uncertainties inherent in choosing treatment." GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS, supra
note 6, at 16. If paternalism is a medical response to known risks and uncertainties, how
much more overreaching may be rationalized from inaccurately pessimistic estimates?
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incorrectly diagnosed as having it (9.6% of 990). Therefore, for
every 103 (8 + 95) patients diagnosed as having breast cancer,
only eight of them actually have it, which equals 7.8% (8/103).
While it is hard to argue that the frequentist calculation is
simple,2 1 it certainly is easier than using Bayes' rule.
2 2
Humans do so poorly at coping with Bayes' rule because
they tend to ignore base rates, "  among other things.24  For
21. Based on the percentage of my students whose eyes roll or glass over when I
introduce them to the straightforward notion of discounting, I would guess that lawyers, if
not doctors, would struggle with even frequentist probabilities. Gigerenzer reports that
"[s]ome physicians and legal scholars have told me that one reason to study medicine or
law was to avoid statistics and psychology." Gigerenzer, Irrational, supra note 17, at 56.
One might wonder if my claim that statistical innumeracy may give rise to medical
malpractice might some day be directed toward legal malpractice. Me, too. Indeed, the
problem may be greater than that:
There is ... growing evidence that people ... have considerable difficulty
expressing their risk estimates numerically .... One questionnaire included
queries such as, "Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk
of getting a disease? 1 in 100[;] 1 in 1000[; and] 1 in 10." Roughly
twenty percent of the respondents . . . answered that question incorrectly.
Likewise, the questionnaire asked: "If the chance of getting a disease is 20
out of 100, this would be the same as having a __ % chance of getting the
disease." Almost thirty percent of all respondents ... answered incorrectly.
Other studies have reinforced this finding of a significant "innumeracy"
problem.
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1544 (1999) (footnotes omitted). That the
frequentist presentation format may be useful, but not a panacea, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1209-11
(2003).
22. See Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 2, at 22-38; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra
note 9, at 697 (noting that "mathematically equivalent information formats need not be
psychologically equivalent"). For some of the latest work pursuing these issues, see, for
example, Gary L. Brase et al., Individuation, Counting, and Statistical Inference: The Role
of Frequency and Whole-Object Representations in Judgment Under Uncertainty, 127 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3 (1998). When the director of the university clinic who
estimated the probability of having breast cancer at 90% was given the problem in a
frequency format, his nervousness dissipated and with the remark, "That's so easy," he
came up with the proper answer. GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 66.
Overall, 46% of the physicians gave the proper Bayesian answer when questioned in the
frequency format. Id.
23. See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & James B. Bushyhead, Physicians' Use
of Probabilistic Information in a Real Clinical Setting, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 259, 264 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2000);
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and
Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN So. 1, 2-3 (1996); Aaron D. Twerski &
Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 628-30 [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen, Decision
Making] (providing an example in frequentist terms). But experience may help. See
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example, in the study above of the problem of estimating the
likelihood of having breast cancer following a positive
mammogram, the base rate is 1%. That is, only 1% of all
women have the disease. Considering this information in light
of false negatives, how would one predict that a particular
woman with a positive mammogram has about a 75% chance of
having the disease? It would seem that the base rate was
ignored, leading perhaps to this type of rough calculation: 80%
of those with a positive mammogram are correctly diagnosed
with cancer, but this must be discounted by the 9.6% false
positives, so knocking about 10% off the 80% leaves 70% or so.
Why do humans tend to ignore base rates when it appears
that even some animals attend to them? 25 Is it because human
minds have "shoddy software" that creates this cognitive
illusion, as some commentators contend?26 If indeed this is the
case, then it would seem to have legal significance. Insofar as
we base legal liability on the standard of the reasonable
person-the person of ordinary prudence-and this person is
incapable of adequately dealing with probabilities in some
circumstances, it would seem that legal responsibility should be
adjusted accordingly. Or perhaps the reasonable person should
be held to a higher standard of prudence. There is additional
reason, beyond only trying to overcome the disability, to get to
Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, supra, at 269; Koehler, supra, at 1 (arguing that the
base rate fallacy has been "oversold," especially "where base rates are implicitly learned or
can be represented in frequentist terms" and other particular circumstances).
24. See, e.g., GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 57. "The literature
of the last 25 years has reiterated again and again the message that people are bad
reasoners, neglect base rates most of the time, neglect false positive rates, and are unable to
integrate base rate, hit rate [(sensitivity or rate of true positives)], and false positive rate the
Bayesian way." Id. at 61 (citation omitted). In general, people are poor at estimating
likelihoods in the face of risk and uncertainty. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 7; RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS
AND PSYCHOLOGY (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). But see
ALEXANDER J. FIELD, ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED?: THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES,
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND THE ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 276-80 (2001) (discussing
the debate over how poorly humans reason statistically); Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) (contending that humans display
greater rationality than implied by legal behavioralists from the research literature).
25. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 57.
26. Id.
536
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the root causes of human struggles with estimating probabilities
and their solutions.
B. Evolutionary Causes?
Rather than dwell on the question of why humans are
supposedly burdened with shoddy mental software relating to
probability estimations, "[t]he program of ecological rationality
suggests a different question: -In what environments, past or
present, would neglect of base rates be rational? The answer is,
when information is acquired through natural sampling, which
yields simple counts (not normalized by base rates... ). The
quoted commentator, Gerd Gigerenzer, is the leading exponent
of this position.28 I turn mainly to his analysis for edification.
During the millions of years in which ancestral humans
were evolving on the African savanna, which was presumably
our own "environment of evolutionary adaptiveness," 29
individuals procured information about risks and uncertainties
by taking note of events as they unfolded.3 ° For example,
maybe they made note of the fact that early each spring certain
root vegetables could almost always be found on the sunny side
of a particular stand of trees, or that on six occasions over the
last ten years a herd of zebras was found in a particular far
valley shortly after the rains began. Perhaps they observed on
each of the last twenty times that large numbers of vultures were
27. Id.
28. See generally, e.g., id; Gigerenzer, Good Judgment, supra note 17; Gerd
Gigerenzer, Does the Environment Have the Same Structure as Bayes' Theorem?, 14
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCi. 495 (1991); Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 9. For additional
citations, see GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 307-09.
29. See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in
THE ADAPTED MIND 19, 69 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) ("[The] functional
organization in the organism-its set of adaptations-is designed to exploit the enduring
properties of the environment in which it evolved (termed its environment of evolutionary
adaptedness, or EEA) ....").
30. GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 57 ("During most of their
history-before the advent of probability theory-humans, like animals, have acquired
information about uncertainties and risks through natural sampling of event frequencies
rather than in terms of probabilities or percentages."); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, From
Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology As the Missing Link, in THE LATEST ON
THE BEST: ESSAYS ON EVOLUTION AND OPTIMALITY 277, 282 (John Duprd ed., 1987)
("Natural selection gave us information processing machinery to produce behavior, just as
it gave us food processing machinery to produce digestion. This machinery selects-and
frequently seeks-particular information from the environment .... ).
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circling in the sky a dead or dying animal was below them, but
on three of these occasions a dangerous pride of lions was also
there devouring a dead animal, and on eight of the occasions a
threatening pack of hyenas was there feeding. If, say, a clan acts
on this accumulated information and goes hunting for zebras in
the far valley shortly after the rains begin only to come back
empty-handed, they will take this into account the next time the
rains begin: now it has been six times out of eleven that the
zebras have been there, so perhaps we should not spend our time
going so far when there are other opportunities for game nearer
by.
This attention to frequencies, or natural sampling, does not
require information regarding base rates. 31  Natural sampling
simply requires "updating event frequencies from experience.
As in the example above, before the last experience with zebra
hunting, the frequency of finding them in the far valley follow-
ing the rains was six out of ten. Now it is six out of eleven.
Thus, ancestral humans gathered numerical information
regarding degrees of uncertainty by means of an original format
of natural frequencies acquired by natural sampling.
3
31. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 57; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, supra note 9, at 687.
32. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 63. "Natural sampling
is different from systematic experimentation, in which the sample sizes (the base rates) of
each treatment group are fixed in advance." Id.
33. Id. at 62; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 9, at 686-87. "Natural frequencies
report the final tally of a natural sampling process." GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING,
supra note 8, at 63. "The sequential acquisition of information by updating event
frequencies without artificially fixing the marginal frequencies (e.g., of disease and no-
disease cases) is what we refer to as natural sampling." Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note
9, at 686 (citation omitted). Boehm refers to "actuarial intelligence," meaning "the
intuitive human capacity, seen abundantly in hunter-gatherers, to think stochastically and to
understand rather complex systems on an intuitive but statistically valid, predictive basis."
CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: THE EVOLUTION OF EGALITARIAN
BEHAVIOR 183-87 (1999); see generally DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND 380-82 (1999) (discussing frequency representations and
judgment under uncertainty). For the view that humans may not excel at processing
frequencies, see Ginzburg et al., supra note 14, at 24 (arguing that "humans seem to be ill-
equipped to process frequency information"). Gigerenzer offers supporting evidence of
human frequency innumeracy. After noting that a particular physician, aware of the
significance of base rates and false positives, said he would advise a woman that she is
likely to have breast cancer after a positive test, probabilities notwithstanding, Gigerenzer
wonders how the radiologist could "perform mammography screening for 25 years and not
notice that most women who test positive do not have breast cancer." GIGERENZER,
CALCULATED RISKS, supra note 6, at 112 (pointing out that the majority of physicians in a
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Along with greater computational simplicity, 34 thinking of
risk and uncertainty in terms of natural frequencies rather than
Bayesian probabilities facilitates the recognition of the
confidence level in the calculated likelihoods.35 Drawing on the
zebra example, if we say that the probability of finding zebras
following the rains is 0.6, this does not telegraph whether this
conclusion is based on five trips to the far valley in which zebras
were found three times, or fifty trips in which zebras were found
thirty times. Obviously we would be more confident of the 0.6
probability of finding the zebras if it was based on fifty trips
rather than five. Three out of five may have been a fluke. There
may have been some unusual floods in recent years that drove
the animals to the far valley from their usual grazing grounds.
Or, to the contrary, the animals may not have been there those
two years only because unusual floods cut them off from the
valley. Time will tell, or hint. On the other hand, if the clan
went to the valley only twice following the beginning of the
rains and both times found no game, they would be more likely
to hunt there again at that time of the year than if they went there
five times without success, even though the Bayesian probability
in both cases is 0.0. Putting the chances in terms of frequencies,
say, six findings of zebras out of ten trips, leads to an automatic
updating of the implicit confidence level when, following the
next hunt, the frequency becomes six out of eleven.
Some of the scholarly literature on human reasoning is
consistent with the proposition that natural frequencies have
driven the evolution of mental algorithms.36 The literature
related experiment also failed to notice). For the modular, domain-specific, cognitive
aspect of human reasoning about frequencies, see Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 2, at 63-
68.
34. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 9, at 687 ("Bayesian algorithms are
computationally simpler when information is encoded in a frequency format rather than a
standard probability format.").
35. See Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 2, at 16-17. For the importance of confidence
levels when using probabilities to meet legal burdens of persuasion, see Cohen,
Conceptualizing, supra note 8, at 91-93; Cohen, Confidence, supra note 9, at 385.
36. Gigerenzer and his fellow researchers found that the intuitive calculations behind
various cognitive functions of the human brain align with different theories of statistics:
"Elementary functions such as sensory detection, discrimination, and recognition in
memory are controlled by a statistician of the Neyman-Pearson-Wald school, causal
reasoning by a Fisherian statistician, perceptual estimation and judgment by a statistician of
the Karl Pearson school, and induction and opinion revision by a Bayesian statistician."
GIGERENZER ET AL., EMPIRE OF CHANCE, supra note 8, at 233.
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includes "(a) a body of studies that report that humans can
monitor frequencies fairly accurately, (b) the thesis that humans
process frequencies (almost) automatically . . . , (c) the thesis
that probability learning and transfer derive from frequency
learning, and (d) developmental studies on counting in children
and animals."3 7 Gigerenzer contends that the human ability to
reason better with frequencies than with Bayesian probabilities
is bottomed on "evolutionary (and developmental) primacy of
natural frequencies and ease of computation., 3 8 This hypothesis
has been tested in real life situations. 3 9
Ill. TORT LAW RAMIFICATIONS
In the healthcare context, the misestimation of
consequences because their probabilities are expressed in terms
of Bayes' rule may substantially impinge on patients, as
suggested by the introductory story. In this section I consider
whether there are legal remedies for the ensuing harms. Two
tort theories are explored: (1) whether a patient actually gives
informed consent when she is misled by a Bayesian presentation
of the relevant data and (2) whether a patient traumatized by an
overestimation of risk stemming from its expression in Bayesian
terms may have a claim against the healthcare provider for the
negligent infliction of emotional harm.
A. Informed Consent
Under the law of torts, a patient must first properly agree to
any medical procedure. The doctrine of informed consent
protects the autonomy of the patient. In the words of Cardozo,
37. GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 64 (citations omitted).
38. Id. In another book, Gigerenzer generalizes beyond frequencies and probabilities:
"The heuristics used by humans.., are adaptive strategies that have evolved in response to
the need to draw inferences and make decisions with bounded knowledge and limited time.
Cognitive resources being limited, good reasoning relies on a toolbox of ecologically
rational fast and frugal strategies." GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT
MAKE US SMART 171 (1999). For a review of the major classes of heuristics, see id. at
358-62.
39. See GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING, supra note 8, at 64-76.
40. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 222 (1985) ("In the face of value pluralism, factual
indeterminacy, and increasing options, patient autonomy has become a central principle of
both popular and philosophical analysis of medical decisionmaking.") (footnotes omitted);
see generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 250-51 (2000). For skepticism as to
540
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"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body ....
,41
Consent is informed when material information about the
proposed procedure, such as the procedure's risks, necessity, and
reasonable alternatives, is revealed.42 In a nutshell, doctors must
fully disclose the significant, material costs and benefits of the
proposed procedure and alternatives, including the alternative of
no treatment at all.43 Depending on the
whether patient autonomy has affected "the decisionmaking process" as much as has often
been assumed, see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed
Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999).
41. Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
42. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating
that the disclosure rule requires the physician generally to "inform[] the patient in non-
technical terms as to what is at stake: the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals
expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment and no
treatment"). "Informed choice is, first and foremost, a process right," protecting the
patient's right "to evaluate all material information in making decisions," and often
involving "an ongoing process" among the parties with a "dynamism all its own." Twerski
& Cohen, Decision Making, supra note 23, at 649.
43. Under medical malpractice and products liability, "the informed choice question
asks whether the doctor or vendor provided the patient or buyer adequate information to
make an intelligent choice." Twerski & Cohen, Decision Making, supra note 23, at 607-
08. In the medical context, physicians "owe their patients a fiduciary duty, which includes
an obligation to act exclusively in the patient's interests and to disclose all information
material to those interests." Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J.
899, 916 (1994); see also Shultz, supra note 40, at 279 ("Doctors are universally conceded
to be fiduciaries; as such they have special duties to serve their clients' interests."). In
these cases, "the more common claim of a patient is that the doctor inadequately warned of
the risks of a given medical intervention, or that the doctor did not adequately explain alter-
native modes of treatment (including the option of non-treatment)." Twerski & Cohen,
Decision Making, supra note 23, at 610. The practice of informed consent in this country
seems far from ideal. One representative of the World Health Organization notes: "In the
U.S., the average physician-patient contact is five minutes. Most of the information is
presented in a vocabulary that is unintelligible to the patient." GIGERENZER, CALCULATED
RISKS, supra note 6, at 16-17. In response, one doctor said: "Sixty percent of patients,
conservatively estimated, do not have the intellectual capacity to make decisions about
treatments themselves." Id. at 17. This is especially true, one might add, when the data is
put in Bayesian terms. Another physician said: "The meeting between physician and pa-
tient is a ritual. False positives have no place in this ritual." Id. at 18. Gigerenzer writes
that true informed consent is rare because the patients do not know what questions to ask,
they are highly emotional under the circumstances, and "there is innumeracy among
physicians, which puts informed consent out of reach." Id. at 98. Institutional,
professional, and economic factors also constrain the physician's ability to facilitate
informed consent. See id. at 112-14.
Behavioral economists have identified other problems in expressing probabilistic
information in a manner that allows the patient to give truly informed consent. For one,
prospective treatment outcomes can be represented in terms of either mortality or survival
rates. These alternative representations are logically equivalent. Eldar Shafir et al., Money
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jurisdiction, the doctor who undertakes a medical procedure
without obtaining express, implied, or substituted consent
commits either a battery or negligence. 4 In the context of the
Illusion, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 24, at 335, 338. Nevertheless, in
one experiment in which subjects were to choose between either surgery or radiation
therapy for lung cancer, "the percentage of respondents who favored radiation therapy rose
from 18 percent in the survival frame to 44 percent in the mortality frame. This result was
observed among experienced physicians, statistically sophisticated business students, as
well as clinic patients." Id.; see Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences
for Alternative Therapies, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
READER, supra note 23, at 272, 278-79. This consequence may run afoul of the ideal in
which the physician is simply to convey relevant information objectively to the patient for
her consideration. One commentator has "argued that if preferences are constructed in the
process of informing, framing the options, and eliciting the response, the rationale behind
the shared model of consent cannot be defended." Paul Slovic, The Construction of
Preference, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 24, at 489, 502 (citation
omitted). To help patients manage their preferences, "patients and physicians might be
advised to sift and weigh alternative reasons or justifications, to work toward developing a
rationale for action." Id. Yet, "there is little reason to believe that more informal
procedures in which the treatments are described in general terms without quantitative
statistical data are less susceptible to the effects of different methods of presentation."
McNeil et al., supra, at 279. A further problem is raised by studies that suggest that people
are weak at "forecast[ing] changes in their hedonic responses to stimuli" and "tend to make
decisions about future consumption without due consideration of possible changes in their
tastes." Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 24, at 758, 767 (citations omitted). Regarding an
operation that may significantly change the patient's life, "truly informed consent is only
possible if patients have a reasonable conception of expected long-term developments in
their hedonic responses, and if they assign appropriate weight to these expectations in the
decision." Id. (questioning whether paternalistic intervention may be appropriate in some
of these circumstances).
44. Other theories of recovery are possible, such as fraud, violation of a statute, or
guaranteed outcomes, depending on the circumstances. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT
TO TREATMENT §§ 1.3.3, 1.3.4 (3d ed. 2006). Since these theories are unlikely to be
applicable to the innocent misestimations considered here, however, they are not addressed
by this article.
Arkansas subscribes to the negligence theory of informed consent. See generally,
e.g., Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 479, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1980); Eady v. Lansford, 351
Ark. 249, 253-54, 92 S.W.3d 57, 60 (2002) (citing section 16-114-206 of the Arkansas
Code for the appropriate standard for measuring the scope of "the physician's duty to
disclose risks" and "the degree of disclosure necessary to render a consent adequate and
informed .... "). Nevertheless, battery may still have a place in the context of Arkansas
informed consent cases; there is some case law suggesting that a medical-battery claim
might provide an additional means of recovery in suits where lack of informed consent is
established under the negligence standard of section 16-24-206(b) of the Arkansas Code.
See Arthur v. Zearley, 320 Ark. 273, 283, 285, 895 S.W.2d 928, 933-34 (1995) (striking
down class certification in medical malpractice action where the individual issue of
informed consent was "foundational to" and necessarily "woven throughout" each of the
plaintiffs' multiple tort claims, which included battery); Parkerson v. Arthur, 83 Ark. App.
240, 250, 125 S.W.3d 825, 831-32 (2003) (dismissing plaintiff's battery claim in informed
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difficulties in understanding probabilities, I examine these two
theories in turn.
1. The Battery Theory
Without proper consent, the touching of a patient by a
doctor is unlawful and therefore a battery, even if no actual harm
is demonstrated.45 Under this theory of informed consent,
misrepresentation of the material facts vitiates the consent.
Unlike the related tort doctrine of fraud which usually requires
the representation to be culpably false, 4 the contract doctrine of
misrepresentation reaches entirely innocent assertions of fact. A
perfectly sincere misrepresentation will suffice to trigger
liability by negating purported consent.47 For example, a claim
of misrepresentation stands even though the doctor truly and
reasonably believes in the accuracy of the misinformation
provided the patient.
While the claim of battery has historically required an
unlawful touching, some courts have relaxed this requirement in
cases involving informed consent in order to protect the
autonomy interests of the patient. For example, some courts
consent case not because battery was an improper theory, but because once the plaintiff's
informed consent claim had been properly dismissed, the battery claim, which was based
on a lack of informed consent, left no genuine issues of fact to be resolved).
45. Shultz, supra note 40, at 224 ("Patient autonomy was initially identified with and
subsumed under an interest in physical security, protected by rules proscribing unconsented
touch.").
46. See generally DOBBS, supra note 40, §§ 469-83.
47. It is common for courts and commentators to run together misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit. See, e.g., ROZOVSKY, supra note 44, § 1.3.3. Technically,
misrepresentation, narrowly conceived, is not a theory of recovery at all, but rather a claim
that a contract, or its particular terms, are unenforceable as obtained without proper
agreement. See, e.g., I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.10, at
468-69 (3d ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 95, at
543-45 (4th ed. 2001). Deceit and fraud are usually considered synonymous and constitute
a theory of recovery in tort. See DOBBS, supra note 40, § 469, at 1344 ("The terms fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation are used as the name of a tort."). Indeed, a misled patient
may have a claim of negligent misrepresentation against her provider. See id ("Negligent
misrepresentation may also be actionable in some cases, but only when the defendant is
under a duty to use care in communicating, as where the defendant is in a special
relationship with the plaintiff."). But this theory is not pursued here because, under the
circumstances, it would largely overlap with the theory of informed consent. See generally
id. § 472. Actually, the contract claim of misrepresentation may be met by demonstrating
that the misrepresentation was either fraudulent or material. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra,
§ 4.12, at 480; MURRAY, supra, § 95, at 538-39.
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under a battery theory have called for doctors to disclose the
risks of refusing diagnostic procedures, such as pap smears or
fetal genetic tests.48 Much of this type of data will doubtlessly
be in probabilistic terms. Without the relaxation of the
requirement of unlawful touching, the doctor's misestimations
of probabilities would not be actionable when the patient
declines follow-up procedures. Nevertheless, though there may
be ways to avoid the strictures of a battery theory, in recent
decades the large majority of courts have jettisoned the battery
theory of informed consent in favor of the more compatible
negligence theory.49
Still, for those jurisdictions retaining a battery theory for
informed consent cases, whether a doctor misinforms a patient
about the risks of a medical procedure due to the difficulty of
understanding probabilities may turn on details.50 To start with
a fairly easy example, in the original illustration of the usually
fatal disease, suppose the doctor states only this:
I have some bad news for you. One of the test results was
positive. While, as usual, there are no perceptible
symptoms at this stage, it appears that you may have an
aggressive disease that is usually fatal. As I look at your
test results, it seems that the chances that you have the
disease are about 95%.
If the patient relies on this estimation in deciding to have an
operation, it is hard to argue that the consent was informed. But
what if the doctor had added, "While I'm no statistician, as I
look at your test results . . . "? This precautionary clause, "I'm
48. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980) ("If a patient
indicates that he or she is going to decline the risk-free test or treatment [here, a routine pap
smear test], then the doctor has the additional duty of advising of all material risks of which
a reasonable person would want to be informed before deciding not to undergo the
procedure."); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13-15 (N.J. 1979) (involving a wrongful birth).
"The wrongful birth claim is asserted by the mother [who] . .. typically claims that, but for
the defendant's negligence in testing or counseling, the mother would have terminated a
pregnancy to avoid birth of a child with serious genetic defects." DOBBS, supra note 40,
§ 291, at 792.
49. See, e.g., Twerski & Cohen, Decision Making, supra note 23, at 611-12. For a
well-reasoned rejection of the battery theory, see Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297,
312-13 (Wis. 1973).
50. See Twerski & Cohen, Decision Making, supra note 23, at 627 ("Unless we know
the manner in which the withheld information would have been presented, we often cannot
credibly predict its effect."). This uncertainty complicates the question whether there is a
causal link between the missing information and the patient's decision. See id. at 638-39.
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no statistician," seems insufficient to put the patient on guard
when the raw test data is not conveyed. But what if, as in the
original example, the doctor gives the raw test data ("The
prevalence of this disease is 1/1000, but the test has a false
positive rate of 5%") and then misestimates the probability of
having the disease at 95% while professing his statistical short-
comings?
Each of these three scenarios strikes me as precluding
informed consent under the battery theory. While the doctor
spoke without knowledge that the information conveyed was
incorrect, knowledge is not an element of misrepresentation.
The most problematic version is where the doctor provides the
proper raw data and then, with cautionary language,
misestimates the probability of having the disease. This also, in
my view, should give rise to liability. In light of the difficulty
most doctors have with Bayesian reasoning, it is most certain
that patients generally have even a harder time. It is entirely
unrealistic to expect the patient to check whether, based on the
given raw data, the doctor's estimation of actually having the
disease is correct, especially when the patient has every reason
to believe that the doctor has greater expertise on the subject,
cautionary language notwithstanding. For most patients, and
many doctors, discussing statistics in Bayesian terms is like
conversing in a foreign language. Information does not
sufficiently inform patients unless it can be reasonably
understood by the ordinary prudent person.
5 1
5 1. "The principal goals of informed consent doctrine ... cannot be achieved unless
the information about the risks associated with various treatment (and non-treatment)
alternatives is reliable and is communicated in a fashion that is intelligible and meaningful
to patients." Schuck, supra note 43, at 948 (footnote omitted). "Nevertheless, . . . the
studies and commentary on informed consent in action suggest that it often fails even this
minimal test. Many physicians discuss risk in a more or less perfunctory manner and
without much regard to how well the patient comprehends the information." Id. "While
many factors contribute to this failure, an important one is the language and concepts that
physicians use to characterize the risks to patients." Id. Schuck then considers a solution
that will not work: "[T]he physician might attempt to use more specific language,
employing more exact quantitative measures (expressing risk, for example, as a numerical
percentage or statistical probability)." Id. (questioning whether such precise language
"may create a spurious and misleading impression of precision"). But seeing the weakness
of this and other proposals, Schuck suggests that physicians "characterize risks ... in
explicitly comparative terms-that is, in terms that encourage the patient to assess the
medical risk in light of other risks that are more familiar to her, risks that she has some
basis for, and experience in, evaluating." Id. at 949.
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An even more complicated scenario is where the doctor
provides only the raw test data: "The prevalence of this disease
is 1/1000, but the test has a false positive rate of 5%." The
doctor says nothing more. Instead, it is the patient rather than
the doctor who, based on this information, misestimates the
chances of having the disease as very high, rather than the truer
2%. When the patient, rather than the doctor, makes the
misestimation, is the ensuing consent informed? Much can be
said for the proposition that even here the disclosure is
insufficient, though in a real sense accurate. It is as if the doctor
is speaking in technical language that cannot reasonably be
expected to inform a patient adequately. 52 Similarly, under the
duty to warn in products liability, the warning must be in
language "'comprehensible to the average user and
convey[ing] a fair indication of the nature and extent of the
danger to the mind of a reasonably prudent person.' ' 53  Raw
Bayesian data hardly meets this standard. For the sake of
efficiency, to say nothing of autonomy interests, health care
providers should be required to convey risk estimations in
comprehensible terms, that is, raw natural frequencies at worst,
and accurate bottom-line likelihoods at best.
2. The Negligence Theory
In most jurisdictions, liability under the informed consent
doctrine is based on the negligent nondisclosure of material
facts, not on a battery theory. 4 The standard elements of the
patient's claim under this negligence theory are:
52. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36 ("Physicians and hospitals have patients of
widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds, and a rule which presumes a degree of
sophistication which many members of society lack is likely to breed gross inequities.").
53. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (Mass. 1985) (citing Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Bituminous
Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. App. 1974))). In
MacDonald, the plaintiff suffered a stroke after using the defendant-manufacturer's birth
control pills. 475 N.E.2d at 67. The manufacturer's warnings, pursuant to FDA
regulations and common law requirements that they be in "lay language," stated that "[t]he
most serious known side effect is abnormal blood clotting which can be fatal," and
included other comparable language, but did not use the term "stroke." Id. at 66-67. The
court held for the plaintiff on her claim that she would not have used the pills if she had
known of the associated risk of stroke. Id. at 72.
54. "Discomfort with treating doctors under a doctrine aimed at antisocial conduct
has prompted most jurisdictions to limit the battery action to those relatively unusual
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(1) nondisclosure of required information; (2) actual
damages such as loss of a leg; (3) resulting from the risks of
which the patient was not informed; (4) cause in fact, which
is to say that the plaintiff would have rejected the medical
treatment if she had known the risk; and (5) that reasonable
persons, if properly informed, would have rejected the
proposed treatment.
5
About half the states base the negligence standard of
required disclosure on medical custom, that is, what a reasonable
doctor would provide under the circumstances. 56  Pursuant to
this standard, a doctor must divulge the information that other
doctors in the relevant community usually reveal for the
particular medical procedure. But even under this standard, it is
not acceptable medical custom for the doctors in the community
to routinely convey misestimated risk probabilities to their
patients. The medical community standard of customary
disclosure relates to the amount of information to be imparted,
not to its accuracy. 57 For the principle of protecting the patient's
autonomy to have any significant meaning at all, divulged
information must be reasonably accurate.
The more difficult questions under the medical custom
standard are whether there is adequate informed consent when:
(1) doctors uniformly qualify their risk estimations with
precautionary language about their deficient statistical skills; (2)
provide both the raw test data and misestimated risk
probabilities; or (3) simply provide the raw test data and let the
patient arrive at the common misestimation of risk.58  When
confronted with these first two scenarios, the courts may well
situations where a medical procedure has been carried out without any consent, rather than
where the consent has merely been insufficiently informed." Shultz, supra note 40, at 226.
"Most litigation about patient autonomy now occurs over doctors' nondisclosure of
information, analyzed as an issue of professional negligence." Id.
55. DOBBS, supra note 40, § 250, at 654 (footnote omitted); see ROZOVSKY, supra
note 44, § 1.3.2.
56. See, e.g., Fuller v. Stames, 268 Ark. 476, 479, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1980);
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504,
509 (N.J. 1988); Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994); see also DOBBS, supra
note 40, § 250, at 655.
57. See ROzOVSKY, supra note 44, § 1.13.1 (Under the medical community standard,
"[t]he amount of disclosure is largely a matter of medical judgment.") (emphasis added).
58. One may be skeptical that any such customs may arise. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at
783 ("[T]he reality of any discernible custom reflecting a professional consensus on
communication of option and risk information to patients is open to serious doubt.").
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decide that the information as understood by the typical patient
is inaccurate. Precautionary language or raw test data notwith-
standing, the patient's attention will be drawn to the doctor's
bottom-line, misestimated risk assessment. Because only the
most sophisticated patient may perceive an inconsistency in the
risk assessments, ensuing consent should not be considered
sufficiently informed. The most difficult scenario, again, is the
third one in which doctors customarily convey only the raw test
data and let the patients routinely draw the inaccurate conclusion
as to risk probabilities. In a strong sense, the information
conveyed by this medical custom is accurate,59 though
misleading. Courts could simply declare that the misleading
overtones trump the underlying accuracy, concluding that
ensuing consent is not informed. Or the courts could overrule
this medical custom as unreasonable. 60  Patients need
transparent data to truly give informed consent, especially in
these emotionally charged situations. At some point the courts
must consider whether the medical custom adequately protects
the patient's autonomy.
The other half of the states embrace a patient or materiality
standard of disclosure for negligence. 61 This turns the focus on
the patient rather than the doctor. The doctor must disclose all
material information-that is, the information that a reasonable
doctor would expect to be material to a patient who is
considering whether to undergo the proposed medical
procedure. This standard requires broader disclosure than
59. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 44, § 1.13.1 ("There is no hard and fast rule regarding
what type of information should or should not be disclosed under the medical community
standard.").
60. The most famous opinion disapproving custom when it is found to be
unreasonable comes from the pen of Learned Hand. The TJ Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d
Cir. 1932) (rejecting the custom among tug boat operators not to have radio receivers on
board to obtain weather forecasts).
61. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal.
1972); Cowman v. Homaday, 329 N.W.2d 422, 425-27 (Iowa 1983); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
295 A.2d 676, 688 (R.I. 1972); DOBBS, supra note 40, § 250, at 655; see also ROZOVSKY,
supra note 44, § 1.13.2.
62. See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 299-300 (Conn. 1983);
Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425; Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985).
In the words of one court, a surgeon must "explain the procedure to the patient and ...
warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to
enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not to
undergo such treatment." Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977). Similarly, in
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63does the medical custom standard. Among the required
information that may have a probabilistic form are the test
results that suggest the proposed medical procedure is needed,
the likelihood of its success, 'the patient's prognosis if the
procedure is declined, and the risks of alternatives. Indeed,
probability inheres in much of the material information. For
example, "[t]he materiality of information about a potential
injury is a function not only of the severity of the injury, but also
of the likelihood that it will occur.",
64
The patient or materiality standard of disclosure quickly
points toward the inadequacy of conveying probabilistic data in
Bayesian terms, even if entirely accurate. A reasonable patient
certainly wants to base her consent to a medical procedure on a
realistic assessment of the risks. Reasonable doctors should
know that the Bayesian approach is unlikely to facilitate this for
most of their patients, just as it often fails for them.
Under either the battery or the negligence theory of
informed consent, the patient has an uphill battle. The track
record of patients claiming only the lack of informed consent is
weak. As one commentator puts it, "[a] complete cause of
action under an informed consent theory is not easy to prove,
and the general consensus in the profession is that these cases
are rarely winners without some independent evidence of
physician malpractice." 65 In situations relating to diagnostic test
results, 'perhaps the highly misleading information about risks
often provided by doctors will get the patient over the litigation
hurdle. Or perhaps the patient should look to another theory of
recovery, such as the negligent infliction of emotional harm.
determining the materiality of a misrepresentation, "[t]he matter is material if . . . a
reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question .... ".RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977).
63. See Twerski & Cohen, Decision Making, supra note 23, at 614 n.27.
64. Precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Mass. 1985).
65. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 6.3, at 146 (1999).
66. For cases involving claims of lack of informed consent as well as negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional harm, see Jones v. Howard Univ., Inc., 589 A.2d 419,
420 (D.C. 1991); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 330 (Md. 1993). For brief discussion of
these cases, see ROZOVSKY, supra note 44, § 1.15.6.
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B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm
Under the cause of action for the negligent infliction of
emotional harm, most courts today grant recovery for
foreseeable emotional harm alone, such as mental anguish,
nervous shock, or emotional distress. 67  But courts are
exceedingly careful to keep this theory of recovery from unduly
expanding, particularly for fear of fraudulent claims and the
slippery slope.68  They have thus adopted various limitations.
Among them, from more to less restrictive, are: (1) an impact
rule whereby the defendant must inflict physical contact on the
plaintiff;69 (2) the rule that, in the absence of impact, the
plaintiff must be in the "zone of danger" when she apprehends
the risk,7 ° or that her emotional distress must have physical
manifestations; and (3) the rule that when physical symptoms of
harm are not present, the emotional distress must be serious or
severe. 71  Furthermore, some courts impose restrictions when
the emotional harm does not follow from an abrupt occurrence,
67. See DOBBS, supra note 40, § 308, at 836; see also Shultz, supra note 40, at 278 &
nn.254-55 ("The interest in freedom from emotional distress also has much in common
with the interest in medical choice. Both interests protect aspects of personal sanctuary.").
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, is not one of the majority of courts. See,
e.g., Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185, 190, 633 S.W.2d 362, 364 (1982). Arkansas does
not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress; instead, some
type of attendant physical injury must be present in order to recover for emotional harm in
Arkansas. HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33:12 (5th ed. 2004)
("Damages for emotional harm are considered parasitic damages in that recovery is allowed
only if they are attached to the host of physical impact."); see also Margaret A. Egan, Note,
Tort Law-Spoliators Beware, but Fear Not an Independent Civil Suit: Goff v. Harold Ives
Trucking Co., 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 233, 253 & n.167 (2001) (explaining that
Arkansas courts have generally been reluctant to recognize new torts).
68. Consequently, development of this tort has been in fits and starts. For example,
in reviewing the case law, Epstein states: "Once again the courts that open the door to new
distress cases are only barely willing to keep it ajar." EPSTEIN, supra note 65, § 10.16, at
280. Indeed, the Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
"goes further than relegating emotional harm to the margins. It excludes it altogether, at
least in those portions of the Restatement relating to basic principles." Martha Chamallas,
Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751, 753 (2001).
One way it does this is by excluding "cases of negligent infliction of mental distress
[because] they are not classified as within 'the core of tort law."' Id.
69. The Restatement adopts this hard line. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 436A (1965).
70. The Restatement advances the "zone of danger" rule for liability for physical
harm resulting from emotional disturbance. See id. § 436, illus. 2.
71. DOBBS, supra note 40, § 308, at 836-38; see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 65,
§§ 10.14-10.17.
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threat of an impact, or contemporary knowledge of a risk of
immediate physical harm.72  Nevertheless, courts are generally
more generous to the plaintiff when the defendant has assumed a
duty to her or such a duty is ordained by law.73
Although the courts have vacillated in recognizing
negligence claims for emotional distress alone,74 in several cases
akin to our problem recovery was allowed despite the limiting
rules. In one, the defendant negligently misread a pap smear test
as negative. When the mistake was found much later, and
proper treatment begun, the plaintiff sued and recovered for her
emotional distress from the increased risk of cancer. 75  Dobbs
sees two crucial factors warranting relief in this case, both of
which are present in our problem. "First, . . . the parties are not
strangers; on the contrary, the defendant has undertaken to care
for the plaintiff professionally and failed to do so. Second, the
fear arises from a specific incident rather than, say, gradual
environmental exposure. ' '7 6  In other cases related to our
problem, where the plaintiff is reasonably put in fear of an
72. See DOBBS, supra note 40, §§ 309, 311.
73. See id. § 312, at 848-50. For example, a doctor who negligently injured a baby
during delivery has been held liable to the mother for her emotional harm even though she
may not have been aware of the newborn's injury until later. See, e.g., Burgess v. Superior
Ct., 831 P.2d 1197, 1209 (Cal. 1992); Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1287 (N.J. 1993).
Under the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor owes a direct duty of care to the mother.
See Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201; see also Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203-05 (Alaska
1995) (holding that despite the lack of physical injury, doctor-patient relationship
establishes duty to avoid negligent misdiagnosis of HIV). But see Heiner v. Moretuzzo,
652 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ohio 1995) (explaining that the doctor-patient relationship does not
itself establish the duty to avoid emotional harm in the absence of actual physical danger).
"When the defendant owes an independent duty of care to the plaintiff, there is no risk of
unlimited liability to an unlimited number of people." DOBBS, supra note 40, § 312, at
849. "An assumed duty or a special relationship with a duty imposed by law might argu-
ably eliminate other restrictive rules, for example, those requiring a physical manifestation
or symptom of harm and those requiring a sudden event, but courts have not yet developed
the logic of assumed duty." Id.
74. EPSTEIN, supra note 65, § 10.17, at 280.
75. Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 989 F.2d 278, 279 (8th Cir. 1993)
(applying Arkansas law). In Gilliam, the Eighth Circuit held that an Arkansas plaintiff may
recover for reasonable mental anguish attributable to the possibility of disease irrespective
of whether the negligent act creates an increased risk of disease. 989 F.2d at 280 & n.3
(noting that the issue was one of first impression in Arkansas); see also BR1LL, supra note
67, §§ 4:7 n.21, 29:2; Mark A. Koppel, Note, Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories:
An Introduction to Fear-of-Disease Damages in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 555 (1995).
No Arkansas court has since discussed the Gilliam case. For Dobbs's discussion of the
Gilliam case, see DOBBS, supra note 40, § 311, at 844-45.
76. DOBBS, supra note 40, § 311.
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egregious disease which fails to develop, some courts have
recognized a cause of action even though no "actual exposure"
was demonstrated,77 as in those cases which allowed recovery
for fear of AIDS following a negligent prick from a needle that
was not tested for the HIV virus. As in our problem, during
the "window of anxiety" before the patient discovers the risk
was misestimated, assuming it was discovered before a medical
procedure was performed, the plaintiffs emotional distress can
be expected to be substantial. 79  Finally, in a fact pattern even
closer to our problem, some courts grant recovery when the
defendant' negligently misdiagnoses the plaintiff as having
AIDS, 8 0 though others deny recovery, pointing out that the
misdiagnosis does not physically endanger the plaintiff.8 1 None
of these cases go as far as some of the scenarios we have
contemplated, such as where the doctor uses cautionary
language disavowing her statistical abilities or where the doctor
77. See, e.g., Faya, 620 A.2d at 330, 339 (Md. 1993) (reversing trial court's dismissal
of plaintiff's negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
against a surgeon who failed to inform patients of his HIV infection prior to operating on
them). But see Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(requiring proof of actual exposure to AIDS); Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d 919,
926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (same). See generally Ivan Yip, Note, AIDSphobia and the
"Window of Anxiety": Enlightened Reasoning or Concession to Irrational Fear?, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 461 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1998)
(declaring that proof of actual exposure is not required when the identity of the patient on
whom the contaminated needle is used is unknown); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,
19, 22 (N.J. 1997) (same); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1163
(N.M. 1996) (same under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm).
79. In Chizmar, where the doctor misdiagnosed an HIV test result, the court allowed
recovery for the long-term emotional injury that extended beyond the period of the
"window of anxiety." 896 P.2d at 205-06.
80. See, e.g., Chizmar, 896 P.2d 196; Bramer v. Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va.
1993); see generally Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and the False-Positive, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1229 (1996); Kenneth C.
Robling, Note, Negligent HIV Testing and False-Positive Plaintiffs: Pardoning the
Traditional Prerequisites for Emotional Distress Recovery, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 655
(1995); Schmid, supra note 6. The leading "misinformation" case is Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, in which the plaintiff stated a cause of action for incorrect diagnosis
of syphilis that lead to the breakup with her husband whom she inferred had been having an
extramarital affair. 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980).
81. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 363-64 (Fla. 1995); Heiner, 652
N.E.2d at 670. This limitation and others, such as the requirement that there be a special
duty to the plaintiff, assumed or legally imposed, create a high hurdle for members of the
patient's family who claim damages for the negligent infliction of emotional harm.
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simply offers the raw test data and lets the patient reasonably
and foreseeably misestimate the risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
Improved education is a solution to the problems arising
from the misunderstandings of probabilistic data. While it
would be beneficial for everyone to better understand
probabilities in this scientific age, the deep nature of the
underlying difficulty may make it unrealistic to expect the
average citizen to become sufficiently sophisticated on such
crucial statistical matters. But one can expect more from the
medical profession. For one, many of a doctor's professional
duties turn on statistically-based decisions. Further, doctors go
through intensive and extensive training that provides an apt
opportunity for the additional education. Finally, medical
professionals are highly intelligent and motivated to master
those concepts that will benefit their patients and themselves.
Yet training doctors to put statistics in terms of frequencies
may not be enough to convey the full import of the information.
In the face of risk and uncertainty, humans are simply bad
reckoners in many ways. 82  The conveyance of probabilistic
information should take this into account. For example, one
advocacy group represented the statistics on prostate cancer this
way: "In 2002, an estimated 189,000 men will be diagnosed
with prostate cancer. This represents one new case every three
minutes." 83 But some experts believe that even data expressed
in this simple and accurate manner may lead people to
exaggerate their own risks.84 Hence, it has been urged that such
statistics be contextualized by comparing them to other risks
more familiar to the average person, as where one compares the
chances of having a particular ailment to having a car accident.
I do not have the expertise to advise medical professionals
on methods of improving their discussions of risks with patients.
But one needs no expertise to come to the sound conclusion that
inaccurate risk assessments are likely to be injurious to patients.
Before the judiciary brandishes its stick of liability to bring this
82. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
83. Gina Kolata, Experts Strive to Put Diseases in Proper Perspective, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2002, at F5.
84. Id.
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problem to their attention, the medical profession should
consider the demands of the Hippocratic Oath: "Above all, do
no harm."
85
85. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 113 (5th ed. 2001) ("Above all ... do no harm.").
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